G\'odel's incompleteness theorem and universal physics theories
| Autor: | Ben-Ya'acov, Uri |
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| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: | |
| Druh dokumentu: | Working Paper |
| DOI: | 10.9734/bpi/nupsr/v2/7335D |
| Popis: | An ultimate universal theory -- a complete theory that accounts, via few and simple first principles, for all the phenomena already observed and that will ever be observed -- has been, and still is, the aspiration of most physicists and scientists. Yet, a basic principle that is embodied in the results of G\"{o}del's incompleteness theorems is that self-referencing leads to logical conflict or failure, as in the liar paradox or Russell's paradox. In physics theories self-referencing necessarily occurs when it is realized that the observer is also a participant in the experienced phenomena -- we, humans, are part of the universe while observing it. Therefore self-referencing, and consequently logical conflicts, are unavoidable, and any theory pretending to be universal is bound to be incomplete. Comment: 12 pages, 1 figure |
| Databáze: | arXiv |
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