Cartel Stability under Quality Differentiation
| Autor: | Bos, Iwan, Marini, Marco |
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| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Economics Letters, 174, 70-73, 2019 |
| Druh dokumentu: | Working Paper |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.10.024 |
| Popis: | This note considers cartel stability when the cartelized products are vertically differentiated. If market shares are maintained at pre-collusive levels, then the firm with the lowest competitive price-cost margin has the strongest incentive to deviate from the collusive agreement. The lowest-quality supplier has the tightest incentive constraint when the difference in unit production costs is sufficiently small. Comment: 17 pages, including 3 additional Appendices |
| Databáze: | arXiv |
| Externí odkaz: |
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