Autor:	Kelly, Jerry S., Qi, Shaofang
Rok vydání:	2018
Předmět:	Mathematics - Combinatorics Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory 91B14
Druh dokumentu:	Working Paper
Popis:	A social choice correspondence satisfies balancedness if, for every pair of alternatives, x and y, and every pair of individuals, i and j, whenever a profile has x adjacent to but just above y for individual i while individual j has y adjacent to but just above x, then only switching x and y in the orderings for both of those two individuals leaves the choice set unchanged. We show how the balancedness condition interacts with other social choice properties, especially tops-only. We also use balancedness to characterize the Borda rule (for a fixed number of voters) within the class of scoring rules. Comment: 16 pages, added link to coauthor
Databáze:	arXiv
Externí odkaz:	http://arxiv.org/abs/1804.02990 Zobrazit plný text záznamu View this record from Arxiv