Janus: An Uncertain Cache Architecture to Cope with Side Channel Attacks
| Autor: | Hosseinzadeh, Hossein, Isakov, Mihailo, Darabi, Mostafa, Patooghy, Ahmad, Kinsy, Michel A. |
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| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | 2017 IEEE 60th International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS) |
| Druh dokumentu: | Working Paper |
| DOI: | 10.1109/MWSCAS.2017.8053051 |
| Popis: | Side channel attacks are a major class of attacks to crypto-systems. Attackers collect and analyze timing behavior, I/O data, or power consumption in these systems to undermine their effectiveness in protecting sensitive information. In this work, we propose a new cache architecture, called Janus, to enable crypto-systems to introduce randomization and uncertainty in their runtime timing behavior and power utilization profile. In the proposed cache architecture, each data block is equipped with an on-off flag to enable/disable the data block. The Janus architecture has two special instructions in its instruction set to support the on-off flag. Beside the analytical evaluation of the proposed cache architecture, we deploy it in an ARM-7 processor core to study its feasibility and practicality. Results show a significant variation in the timing behavior across all the benchmarks. The new secure processor architecture has minimal hardware overhead and significant improvement in protecting against power analysis and timing behavior attacks. Comment: 4 pages, 4 figures |
| Databáze: | arXiv |
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