| Autor: |
Grandi, Umberto, Hughes, Daniel, Rossi, Francesca, Slinko, Arkadii |
| Rok vydání: |
2017 |
| Předmět: |
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| Druh dokumentu: |
Working Paper |
| Popis: |
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem implies the existence of voters, called manipulators, who can change the election outcome in their favour by voting strategically. When a given preference profile admits several such manipulators, voting becomes a game played by these voters, who have to reason strategically about each others' actions. To complicate the game even further, counter-manipulators may then try to counteract the actions of manipulators. Our voters are boundedly rational and do not think beyond manipulating or countermanipulating. We call these games Gibbard--Satterthwaite Games. In this paper we look for conditions that guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibria in pure strategies. |
| Databáze: |
arXiv |
| Externí odkaz: |
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