Autor: |
Vigeral, Guillaume, Viossat, Yannick |
Rok vydání: |
2016 |
Předmět: |
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Zdroj: |
Operations Research Letters, Elsevier, 2016, 44, pp.19-24 |
Druh dokumentu: |
Working Paper |
DOI: |
10.1016/j.orl.2015.11.002 |
Popis: |
Any nonempty, compact, semi-algebraic set in [0, 1] n is the projection of the set of mixed equilibria of a finite game with 2 actions per player on its first n coordinates. A similar result follows for sets of equilibrium payoffs. The proofs are constructive and elementary. |
Databáze: |
arXiv |
Externí odkaz: |
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