| Autor: |
Bosansky, Branislav, Branzei, Simina, Hansen, Kristoffer Arnsfelt, Miltersen, Peter Bro, Sorensen, Troels Bjerre |
| Rok vydání: |
2015 |
| Předmět: |
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| Druh dokumentu: |
Working Paper |
| Popis: |
The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the follower) plays a best response to this strategy (ties are broken in favor of the leader). We study Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential games (or extensive-form games) and provide new exact algorithms, approximate algorithms, and hardness results for several classes of these sequential games. |
| Databáze: |
arXiv |
| Externí odkaz: |
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