Structured populations facilitate cooperation in policed Public Goods Games

Autor:	Kaiping, Gereon A., Sluckin, Timothy J., Cox, Simon J.
Rok vydání:	2015
Předmět:	Quantitative Biology - Populations and Evolution Physics - Physics and Society
Druh dokumentu:	Working Paper
Popis:	Societies consisting of cooperative individuals seem to require for their continuing success that defectors be policed. The precise connection between punishers and benefits, population structure, and division of labour, however, remains ill-understood. Many models assume costly "peer punishment" to enforce cooperation, but results in the economics literature suggest that this assumption may not be generally valid. In many human and animal societies, there is a division of labour between a purely supportive majority and a dedicated minority of police-like enforcers. Here we present several extensions to the Public Goods Game with punishment which allow for this possibility, and evaluate their influence on the level of cooperative behaviour. We find that a structure of separate subpopulations, which only interact through migration of individuals, can have a strong effect on the evolutionary dynamics of a system and significantly facilitate cooperation. Forcing defectors to contribute and enabling fitness transfers to punishers both have a weak positive effect on cooperation levels. In the presence of group competition, however, evolutionary effects can paradoxically hinder cooperation. Comment: This paper has been withdrawn because a sign error in the simulation invalidates the results given here
Databáze:	arXiv
Externí odkaz:	http://arxiv.org/abs/1503.04180 Zobrazit plný text záznamu View this record from Arxiv