| Autor: |
Shan, Yuquan, Raghuram, Jayaram, Kesidis, George, Griffin, Christopher, Levitt, Karl, Miller, David J., Rowe, Jeffry, Scaglione, Anna |
| Rok vydání: |
2014 |
| Předmět: |
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| Druh dokumentu: |
Working Paper |
| Popis: |
For a simple model of price-responsive demand, we consider a deregulated electricity marketplace wherein the grid (ISO, retailer-distributor) accepts bids per-unit supply from generators (simplified herein neither to consider start-up/ramp-up expenses nor day-ahead or shorter-term load following) which are then averaged (by supply allocations via an economic dispatch) to a common "clearing" price borne by customers (irrespective of variations in transmission/distribution or generation prices), i.e., the ISO does not compensate generators based on their marginal costs. Rather, the ISO provides sufficient information for generators to sensibly adjust their bids. Notwithstanding our idealizations, the dispatch dynamics are complex. For a simple benchmark power system, we find a price-symmetric Nash equilibrium through numerical experiments. |
| Databáze: |
arXiv |
| Externí odkaz: |
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