The Social Climbing Game
| Autor: | Bardoscia, Marco, De Luca, Giancarlo, Livan, Giacomo, Marsili, Matteo, Tessone, Claudio J. |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2012 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Statistical Physics 151 (2013), pp. 440-457 |
| Druh dokumentu: | Working Paper |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s10955-013-0693-0 |
| Popis: | The structure of a society depends, to some extent, on the incentives of the individuals they are composed of. We study a stylized model of this interplay, that suggests that the more individuals aim at climbing the social hierarchy, the more society's hierarchy gets strong. Such a dependence is sharp, in the sense that a persistent hierarchical order emerges abruptly when the preference for social status gets larger than a threshold. This phase transition has its origin in the fact that the presence of a well defined hierarchy allows agents to climb it, thus reinforcing it, whereas in a "disordered" society it is harder for agents to find out whom they should connect to in order to become more central. Interestingly, a social order emerges when agents strive harder to climb society and it results in a state of reduced social mobility, as a consequence of ergodicity breaking, where climbing is more difficult. Comment: 14 pages, 9 figures |
| Databáze: | arXiv |
| Externí odkaz: |
|