Path coalitional games
| Autor: | Aziz, Haris, Sørensen, Troels Bjerre |
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| Rok vydání: | 2011 |
| Předmět: | |
| Druh dokumentu: | Working Paper |
| Popis: | We present a general framework to model strategic aspects and stable and fair resource allocations in networks via variants and generalizations of path coalitional games. In these games, a coalition of edges or vertices is successful if it can enable an s-t path. We present polynomial-time algorithms to compute and verify least core payoffs of cost-based generalizations of path coalitional games and their duals, thereby settling a number of open problems. The least core payoffs of path coalitional games are completely characterized and a polynomial-time algorithm for computing the nucleolus of edge path coalitional games on undirected series-parallel graphs is presented. Comment: 15 pages; To be presented at The Second Workshop on Cooperative Games in Multiagent Systems (COOPMAS 2011) |
| Databáze: | arXiv |
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