Autor:	Matzke, Christina, Challet, Damien
Rok vydání:	2008
Předmět:	Physics - Physics and Society Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory
Druh dokumentu:	Working Paper
DOI:	10.1103/PhysRevE.84.016107
Popis:	Tuning one's shower in some hotels may turn into a challenging coordination game with imperfect information. The temperature sensitivity increases with the number of agents, making the problem possibly unlearnable. Because there is in practice a finite number of possible tap positions, identical agents are unlikely to reach even approximately their favorite water temperature. We show that a population of agents with homogeneous strategies is evolutionary unstable, which gives insights into the emergence of heterogeneity, the latter being tempting but risky. Comment: 13 pages, 7 figures
Databáze:	arXiv
Externí odkaz:	http://arxiv.org/abs/0801.1573 Zobrazit plný text záznamu View this record from Arxiv