Committed MPC:Maliciously Secure Multiparty Computation from Homomorphic Commitments

Autor: Frederiksen, Tore Kasper, Pinkas, Benny, Yanai, Avishai
Přispěvatelé: Abdalla, Michel, Dahab, Ricardo
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2018
Zdroj: Frederiksen, T K, Pinkas, B & Yanai, A 2018, Committed MPC : Maliciously Secure Multiparty Computation from Homomorphic Commitments . in M Abdalla & R Dahab (eds), Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2018 : 21st IACR International Conference on Practice and Theory of Public-Key Cryptography, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, March 25-29, 2018, Proceedings, Part I . Springer, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 10769, pp. 587-619, 21st IACR International Conference on Practice and Theory of Public-Key Cryptography, PKC 2018, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 25/03/2018 . https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76578-5_20
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-76578-5_20
Popis: We present a new multiparty computation protocol secure against a static and malicious dishonest majority. Unlike most previous protocols that were based on working on MAC-ed secret shares, our approach is based on computations on homomorphic commitments to secret shares. Specifically we show how to realize MPC using any additively-homomorphic commitment scheme, even if such a scheme is an interactive two-party protocol.Our new approach enables us to do arithmetic computation over arbitrary finite fields. In addition, since our protocol computes over committed values, it can be readily composed within larger protocols, and can also be used for efficiently implementing committing OT or committed OT. This is done in two steps, each of independent interest:1. Black-box extension of any (possibly interactive) two-party additively homomorphic commitment scheme to an additively homomorphic multiparty commitment scheme, only using coin-tossing and a “weak” equality evaluation functionality.2. Realizing multiplication of multiparty commitments based on a lightweight preprocessing approach.Finally we show how to use the fully homomorphic commitments to compute any functionality securely in the presence of a malicious adversary corrupting any number of parties.
Databáze: OpenAIRE