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If someone denied the existence of resultant moral luck, s/he would probably argue that the no-fault compensation system is fairer than a standard account of tort liability. Agents are not responsible for the consequences and harms they cause but only for the risks they create. David Enoch recently argued that such an approach lacks personal liability taken on by agents. For him, taking responsibility is an exercise of normative power based on the specific role of an agent living and acting in the real world. Enoch claims that agents not only may but even ought to take responsibility for things for which they were not responsible per se. I believe that Enoch’s position is incoherent and taking responsibility is irrelevant for tort liability. First, I claim that the obligation to take responsibility is unfair because the agent obligated to take responsibility for the consequences of their actions is still under the influence of moral luck. In this case specifically, they are under circumstantial moral luck, which determines the kind of dilemmas and situations the agent faces. Therefore, if one takes responsibility for the consequences of their actions, s/he is responsible for them. But if s/he does not take responsibility for the consequences of his or her actions, s/he is still responsible for failing to comply with the obligation to take responsibility. This responsibility cannot be escaped - it is like a moral trap. Second, tort liability is not about taking responsibility based on one’s own decision. It is about imposing legal liability on meeting the conditions set by hypological legal norms (i.e. norms determining issues of responsibility). Leaving this at the discretion of the offender may lead to a violation of the victim's rights and denial of the basic functions of tort law. Odškodninska odgovornost brez prevzemanja odgovornosti. Izziv za Enochovo idejo o prevzemanju odškodninske odgovornosti. Če bi kdo zanikal obstoj moralne sreče glede izida dejanj, bi najbrž trdil, da je ne-krivdni sistem kompenzacije pravičnejši od standardnega modela odškodninske odgovornosti. Agenti niso odgovorni za posledice in škodo, ki jo povzročijo, temveč le za tveganja, ki jih ustvarijo. David Enoch je nedavno zatrjeval, da takšen pristop ne vključuje prevzemanja osebne odgovornosti. Zanj je prevzemanje odgovornosti izvajanje normativne moči, ki temelji na posebni vlogi agenta, ki živi in deluje v resničnem svetu. Enoch trdi, da bi agenti morali prevzemati odgovornost za stvari, za katere sami po sebi niso bili odgovorni, in ne le, da bi to lahko počeli. Avtor tega članka pa meni, da Enochovo stališče ni koherentno in da je prevzemanje odgovornosti nepomembno za odškodninsko odgovornost. Najprej avtor trdi, da je obveznost prevzeti odgovornost za izid dejanj nepravična, saj na agenta, ki je k temu zavezan, še vedno vpliva moralna sreča. V tem primeru gre za moralno srečo v okoliščinah, ki določa vrsto dilem in situacij, s katerimi se agent sooča. Torej, četudi agent ne prevzame odgovornosti za izid svojih dejanj, je še vedno odgovoren za neizpolnitev obveznosti prevzeti odgovornost. Tej odgovornosti se ni mogoče izogniti – gre za neke vrste moralno past. Končno avtor trdi še, da pri odškodninski odgovornosti ne gre za prevzemanje odgovornosti na podlagi osebne odločitve, pač pa za izpolnitev pogojev iz tistih pravnih norm, ki določajo vprašanje odgovornosti. Če to prepustimo diskreciji storilca, lahko pride do kršitve žrtvinih pravic in zanikanja osnovnih funkcij odškodninskega prava. |
