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Este trabajo tiene dos objetivos: (i) Rechazar la tesis difundida e íntimamente ligada a la idea de Estado de derecho que, técnicamente formulada, afirma que los sistemas de normas jurídicas que determinan las competencias de las autoridades públicas son cerrados porque contienen una regla de clausura residual que dispone que las autoridades constituidas son incompetentes para realizar actos jurídicos normativos que no hayan sido expresamente incluidos entre sus competenciaspor la autoridad constituyente; expresada de otro modo, esta regla dispone que todo individuo cuyo estatus normativo no está expresamente sujeto a la competencia de una autoridad constituida por la autoridad constituyente, tiene una inmunidad frente a la autoridad constituida; y (ii) Defender la tesis (opuesta) según la cual aquellos sistemas son cerrados porque contienen una regla de clausura residual que dispone que todo individuo cuyo estatus normativo no ha sido expresamente excluido, por una inmunidad instituida por la autoridad constituyente, de la competencia de una autoridad constituida, está sujeto a ella. Para cumplir estos objetivos se reconstruyen las herramientas de análisis que han sido desarrolladas para demostrar que los sistemas de normas jurídicas regulativas son cerrados cuando contienen una regla de clausura residual que dispone que todo lo que no está prohibido, está permitido. This work has two aims. Its first aim is to reject the widespread thesis, closely associated with the idea of the rule of law, which, technically formulated, maintains that the legal normative systems that determine the powers of public authorities are closed because they contain a residual closure rule that states that the constituted authorities have no competence to execute the normative acts that they have not been expressly authorised to do by the constituent authority. In other words, this rule states that any person whose normative status has not been expressly subjected to the powers of a constituted authority by the constituent authority enjoys immunity from it. The second aim of the paper is to defend the (alternative) thesis according to which these systems are closed because they contain a residual closure rule that says that any person whose normative status has not been explicitly exempted from the competence of a constituted authority by an immunity established by the constituent authority is subject to it. In pursuing these two goals, the author uses the analytic tools developed to show that systems of regulative legal norms are closed if they contain a residual closure rule that says that anything that is not prohibited is permitted. |
