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This article aims at providing an interpretation of Avicenna’s theory of human intellection. The main problem about this theory concerns the way in which it is presented in two famous chapters of Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Nafs (Book of the Soul), that is, chapter II, 2, where Avicenna provides a general account of his theory of abstraction (tağrīd), and chapter V, 5 where, in order to outline the process leading to the first acquisition of a material form, Avicenna combines the abstractive paradigm with an emanatist model, in which the presence of the Active Intellect (al-‘aql al-fa‘‘al) seems to be crucial. The claim I defend in this article is that abstraction and emanation, far from being incompatible, are Avicenna’s answer to two problems that Aristotle’s account of human intellection has left unsolved, i.e. the epistemological problem concerning the first acquisition of universal forms, and the ontological problem of the place in which they are stored. The cornerstone of Avicenna’s theory of human intellection, which guarantees its fundamental unity, is the Active Intellect to which Avicenna assigns two different, but complementary roles: at the epistemological level, the Active Intellect is the source of intelligibility of any intellectual form in the sublunar realm, since it provides the condition of possibility for the human intellect’s potentiality to conceive intellectual forms; whereas, at the ontological level, the Active Intellect is the collector of intellectual forms, because Avicenna’s denial of intellectual memory requires a depository of the intellectual forms already acquired in order to avoid supposing that a new process of acquisition is initiated for every subsequent recovery of an intellectual form. |
