Popis: |
The work proposes an analysis of the various tools that can be invoked to bridge some frictions of the credit system in areas where the banking "service" is characterized by essentiality, such as in the case of bank account. The inefficiency of the traditional code regulations emerges with particular evidence when the recourse to banking intermediation is imposed by specific rules functionality to public interests, as in case of imposed virtual currency payments. The incidence of the cost of the service, often not adequately remunerated by the price, can cause an indiscriminate selection of customers, permitted by contractual rules that authorize the end of the relationship without requiring any state reason obligation. The refusal to contract and the ad nutum withdrawal, affecting constitutionally relevant freedoms and rights, force the judge to assess the legitimacy of banking company executive behavior, in a context presided by the transparency principle which allows an evolutionary interpretation of rules inspired by an outdated concept of negotiation autonomy. |