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Magistrsko delo obravnava finančna tveganja članov uprav bank. Primarno analizira bančno specifične dolžnosti in odškodninsko odgovornost članov uprav za njihove kršitve. Nadalje izpostavlja glavne praktične omejitve uveljavljanja odškodninske odgovornosti – odnos kolegialnosti med organi banke, informacijsko asimetrijo, pomanjkanje ekspertize, trajanje in stroške sodnih postopkov ter pomanjkanje razpoložljivih osebnih sredstev za poplačilo nastale škode. V luči izpostavljenih omejitev ter nezadostnega uveljavljanja odgovornosti v praksi naslavlja alternativne mehanizme korporativnega upravljanja – sisteme prejemkov, specifično nagrajevanje, in zavarovanje odgovornosti. Primerno strukturirani prejemki članov uprav predstavljajo vire finančnega tveganja pri opravljanju funkcije in jih motivirajo za previdno upravljanje, usmerjeno v dolgoročno vzdržno poslovanje banke. Pri tem se kot posebej učinkoviti izkažejo mehanizmi nagrajevanja z dolžniškimi in s hibridnimi instrumenti, medtem ko so lastniški instrumenti neučinkoviti zaradi povzročanja moralnega tveganja. Zaradi odgovornosti za škodo z osebnim premoženjem se kot pomemben vir spodbud izkaže D&O zavarovanje članov uprav bank, ki jim v primeru uveljavljanja odškodninskega zahtevka zagotavlja pravno-ekonomsko zaščito. Zavarovanje predstavlja vir zmanjšanja finančnega tveganja, ki bankam olajša kadrovanje in posameznikom omogoča sprejemanje poslovnih odločitev brez strahu pred uveljavljanjem odškodninske odgovornosti. V luči navedenih prednosti sklenjenega zavarovanja magistrsko delo za člane uprav bank zagovarja njegovo obvezno sklenitev, zaradi sposobnosti signalizacije kvalitete korporativnega upravljanja banke pa spodbuja tudi obvezno javno razkritje informacije o višini zavarovalne premije. The following thesis examines the financial risks faced by bank board members. It primarily analyzes bank board members' corporate legal duties and the civil liability attached to breaches thereof. Subsequently, the thesis highlights the main practical issues related to the enforcement of bank board members' civil liability – boardroom culture, information asymmetry, lack of expertise, duration and costs of litigation, and lack of available members' personal funds to repay the damages. In response to the inefficiencies of civil liability enforcement, the thesis analyzes specific alternative corporate governance mechanisms, namely compensation schemes and D&O insurance. Bankers' remuneration systems, if structured appropriately, may provide a source of financial risk faced by boards and may therefore motivate the members to execute their professional duties prudently, ensuring long-term bank stability. In this respect, remuneration systems containing debt-related and hybrid instruments bear great potential, while equity-based instruments lack efficiency due to the moral hazard they cause. Additionally, D&O insurance is examined, as it presents an adequate source of incentives, providing legal and economic assistance to bank boards in case of civil liability enforcement. D&O insurance reduces the financial risks faced by board members, hereby allowing for efficient board recruitment, member retention, and confident decision-making with minimal fear of civil lawsuits. Due to the numerous benefits attached thereto, the thesis promotes the obligatory establishment of Slovenian bank boards' D&O insurance. Moreover, as the insurance premium acts as a proxy of banks' corporate governance quality, the public disclosure of premium size should be mandated as obligatory in Slovenian banking law. |
