Густав Шпет: теория смысла как онтология социальности
| Jazyk: | ruština |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2014 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Вестник Томского государственного университета. |
| ISSN: | 1561-803X 1561-7793 |
| Popis: | Рассматривается теория смысла и онтология социальности русского философа Г.Г. Шпета (1879-1937) как предвосхищение целого ряда тенденций, проявивших себя позднее в развитии феноменологии и в целом западной философии ХХ в., таких как языковой поворот и обращение к проблематике интерсубъективности. Теория смысла Шпета раскрывается здесь через анализ концептов «энтелехия» и «социальная интуиция». Также показывается связь смысла и «общности», образующая телеологический горизонт мира, и исследуется вопрос о презентативности языкового знака. For Russian philosopher Gustav Shpet (1879-1937) the conception of sense is inseparable from the question of ''community''. In his Appearance and Sense (1914) he argues with Edmund Husserl for whom the sense comes out as the telos of intentionality, but at the same time is reduced to the intuitive fulfilment. For Shpet the sense proves to be an attribute of sociality, which is being given neither in the eidetic nor in the empiric intuitions as such. This sense requires its own special ''social'' intuition, which would also express the concrete integrity of experience, and would clarify the mode of connection between the sensual and the ideal intuitions as well. This sense that is being immediately ''perceived'' by the intelligible or understanding intuition is designated by Shpet with Aristotle's term ''entele-chy'' (svxsXs%sia). Entelechy reveals the rational motivation of things as their being in the ''teleological state''. It is notable that entelechy is being treated by Shpet as a clearly ''inner, intimate'' sense of the thing, for which the noematic content serves only as an outward ''sign''. This sense which is pointed by the things as ''signs'' is finally the whole of their reasonable connection the ''world'' itself or even the ''being-in-the-world''. But this sense is not something completed, and is not subject to synoptic comprehension from the outside it is disclosed only through the involvement in it, ''from the inside'' (which also expresses its ''intimacy''). The affirmation of ''entelechy'' as the ''intrinsic'' sense of the thing also means that this sense would no longer be unilaterally attributed to the thing by the subject. The sense can not be reduced to the mere effect of ''sense-giving'' (Sinngebung): ''I'', an isolated subject is by no means its terminal source. According to Shpet's formula, ''I'' is a ''social thing'', and its being is historic, linguistic, and hermeneutic (understanding). From Shpet's side it is not only the criticism of the ''neutrality'' of the subject, but also the recognition of the ontological priority of transpersonal structures such as language, history, and so on: the subjectivity is rather a derivative than a ground of the activity of the ''linguistic consciousness''. However, the social intuition as the ability to understand sense roots in communication, and can be brought into correlation with what is traditionally designated as consensus. ''Logos'' or rationality itself proves that ''I'' has a communicative essence, being nothing but an ''echo of the other'' itself. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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