Россия между несовременными «Приказными» институтами и современной демократической культурой
| Jazyk: | ruština |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2012 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Мир России. Социология. Этнология. |
| ISSN: | 1811-038X |
| Popis: | Процесс трансформации, в который Россия вошла в конце XX в., актуализировал вопросы: «кто мы: нация или цивилизация?», «как соединить и осмыслить досоветскую, советскую и постсоветскую части нашей истории?», «что мы хотим?», «что мы можем?», «на что в нашем прошлом можно и стоит опереться?», «принадлежим ли мы Европе или у нас "особый путь"?», «как соединить и осмыслить досоветскую, советскую и постсоветскую части нашей истории?», «какая модернизация нам нужна и насколько неразрывно она связана с вестернизацией?». Для того чтобы ответить на эти вопросы, нам потребуется система понятий, включающая понятия «локальной цивилизации», «субцивилизации», «приказной институциональный принцип» и ряд других. Тогда можно будет понять цикличность российской истории, возможна ли для России альтернатива демократии западного типа («третий путь») и почему в истории России равнопопулярны утверждения, что «Россия это европейская страна» и «Россия это не Европа». In this paper I develop the notions of 'local (sub)civilization' and its 'political' and 'cultural nuclei' in order to describe and explain the main features of Russian history in the XVIII-XXth centuries and project the possible scenarios in the nearest future. The 'cultural core' is defined as a sum of basic meanings, such as the meaning of individual's life, ideals, highest values, etc. The 'political core' is essentially a set of basic principles which determine the character of relations in a society. I distinguish two types of principles here: the so called 'contractual' (natural for the Western states) and 'mandatory' (natural mostly among the large non-Western societies). In the latter case I distinguish the structure which consists of two subsystems: 'basic' and 'attendant'. 'The ruler' (either individual or collective), 'the masses', and the state ideology are the main elements of the first; the elements of the second are: 'the ruler', his court, officials, civil and army officers, engineers, and other strata of educated urban population with their high culture related to education. The attributes of the masses are 1) delegating the rights of decision-making (and responsibility) to the 'ruler' and 2) initiating revolts (from time to time), when people get unsatisfied with how 'the ruler' fulfills his job. The particular thing about these revolts is that they never transform the social structure, even if they are successful. In the Russian history we have had, at least, three such 'attempts': in the XVIIth century, 1917 and 1991. These revolts interleave with cycles of reforms and anti-reforms, which are forced through the 'attendant' subsystem. The main reason for such cycles is the perpetuating contradiction between the essentially non-European institutional system and European high culture of elites: the Russians keep catching up Europe by fostering education and freedom, but the latter sooner or later collide with 'mandatory' political system, which usually leads to counter-reaction in the form of anti-reform. This freedom-loving minority was at times associated with the young military officers in the end of XVIIIth the beginning of XIXth centuries, university audience of the XIXth century, scientists and engineers of the military-industrial complex of the second half of the XXth century and, finally, the 'Bolotnaya Ploschad' in the end of 2011, which was mostly represented by the socially and culturally advanced urban population of contemporary Russia. The concepts of 'political' and 'cultural nuclei' allow to define 'modernization' as a transition from 'mandatory' to 'contractual' type of societal organization, while 'modernization without westernization' can be regarded as a smooth transition, which preserves the main features of civilization 'cultural core' (which is, in fact, the case of Japan and Eastern Tigers). Russia's attempts to launch this kind of transition (the Decembrist Revolt in 1825, the February revolution of 1917 and, to a certain extent, the August of 1991) have choked, since the creative minority has been principally weak as opposed to the enormous inertia of the 'mandatory' political system. On the other hand, the revolutions brought by the masses have always brought radical change, but paradoxically replicated this 'mandatory' system again and again. The analysis in the article shows that appealing to the protest attitudes of the masses without changing their attitudes towards democracy and paternalism is a strategy doomed to fail. The necessity of modernization is recognized by almost everyone in Russia today, but it is has to be recognized that it would be impossible with preserving the 'mandatory' system. The major difficulty is that the creative minority are too few and share too different ideologies to bring this knowledge to |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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