Роль принципов в моральном решении
| Jazyk: | ruština |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2015 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Вестник Томского государственного университета. Философия. Социология. Политология. |
| ISSN: | 2311-2395 1998-863X |
| Popis: | Обсуждается возможное решение кантовской моральной дилеммы в свете распространенной в англоязычной литературе полемики между принципалистами, настаивающими на решающей роли принципов в определении конкретных моральных решений, и партикуляристами, подчеркивающими роль контекстов. Утверждается, что возможное решение требует переопределения природы и роли принципов. Принцип требует интерпретации и конкретизации и не может быть непосредственно применен. Тогда требование безусловности относится только к принципу, а не к конкретной норме. Представляется, что предложенная трактовка обеспечивает методологию решения дилемм типа: допустима ли ложь для спасения жизни третьего лица. The article discusses a possible solution to a moral dilemma Kant formulated in the light of the polemic between generalists and particularists.Issue is broadly discussed by modern English-speaking scholars. Generalists insist on the decisive role of moral principles in determining morally relevant properties or relations and correctness of our actions. Particularists argue that morality of certain characteristics is determined by the context; thus, an agent's appeal to moral principles for understanding of particular cases is ill founded. It is alleged that a possible solution to the problem requires a redefinition of the nature and role of the principle. It is argued that no principle can be applied directly. The principle is designed to generally differentiate between the moral and the non-moral and direct the search for morally significant features and correct actions. Therefore, principle application needs its interpretation (e.g., what means "to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, never as a means only but always at the same time as an end") and specification (what actions should be implemented in a given situation for all participants to be treated as an end in themselves, not a means). Then the requirement of unconditionality refers only to the principle. Any specific norm or action will always be conditioned. It seems that the proposed interpretation of the nature and role of the principle provides a methodology for solving the dilemmas of the Kantian type: should one lie to a murderer to save the life of a third person. If the principle requires treating any rational human being as an end, not a means, it is proved that in this context it is lying that provides for treating all the participants of the situation as an end. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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