К вопросу о соотношении категорий «Вина» и «Цель» преступления

Jazyk: ruština
Rok vydání: 2011
Předmět:
Zdroj: Вестник Томского государственного университета.
ISSN: 1561-803X
1561-7793
Popis: Рассматриваются проблемы соотношения категорий «вина» и «цель» преступления, в частности вопросы зависимости вида умысла от цели, которую желает достичь лицо в результате совершения преступления. Анализируются точки зрения, высказанные по данному поводу в уголовно-правовой литературе. На основе проведенного исследования сформулирована собственная позиция относительно изучаемого вопроса, высказаны предложения по совершенствованию практики квалификации преступлений
Questions of the subjective aspect of a crime traditionally are of great interest for researchers. Despite a large number of works concerning this theme most of these questions still do not have a unique solution. The issue of correlation of such categories as guilt and purpose of a crime particularly requires its further scientific consideration. This research shows that there are two main positions on this issue formulated in the scientific literature. Supporters of the first one (P.S. Dagel, D.P. Kotov, O.S. Sitkovskaya, Yu.A. Krasikov and others) believe that purpose is structurally included into the content of guilt: it is its component and, thus, it is reflected in the concepts of criminal intent and negligence. Their opponents (A.I. Rarog, O.S. Kapinus, G.F. Tselnicker and others) criticize the above mentioned position and suggest distinguishing guilt as a primary feature of the subjective aspect of a crime and other psychological elements (as purpose, motivation, and emotions) as optional features. On the one hand, this is justified by the position demonstrated by the legislator in determining of forms and types of guilt. On the other hand, it is supported by the instability of the purpose category, which can lead to its unreasonably broad understanding and, as a result, to an incorrect understanding of the essence of guilt. According to the author of the article guilt and purpose are independent, but also interdependent categories. So, denying the purpose directedness of certain guilt types (e.g., direct intention) would be wrong. Firstly, some researchers who offer the definition of direct criminal intent do this by specifying the purpose of the crime (E.Ya. Nemirovsky, A.Ya. Estrin, V.G. Makashvili, R.I. Mikheev and others). Secondly, it is confirmed by the practice of the courts: to highlight just a direct intent in the actions of the guilty person courts point in the sentences that the person acted with the intention to cause consequences. Thus, we can conclude that the direct criminal intent immanently has purpose, which is expressed in a desire to achieve the anticipated results (socially dangerous consequences). The article also studies the possibility of committing a crime, which includes a special purpose with indirect criminal intent. Thus, the author offers a critical attitude to the existing axiom in the theory of criminal law a special purpose is compatible only with the direct intention and admits the possibility of combination of a special purpose with any kind of intended form of guilt. It is justified, on the one hand, by the psychology data, according to which any realized volitional action is purposeful and committed to achieve some goal. Therefore, any intended crime (as a special case of volitional action) always assumes such characteristic, regardless of whether a special purpose is specified in the text of the law or not. On the other hand, the criticized axiom assumes a dominant role in determining the type of intention of the legislator only. It turns out that the intention type depends not on the mental activity of the person. It is pre-determined by the people, who write laws. It is obviously wrong. Therefore, a judge should evaluate an offense meaningfully in each case, including the purpose of acts, rather than mechanically base on a controversial theoretical concept.
Databáze: OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz: