BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY FOR UNCONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE: A SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR ASYMMETRIC DEFENSE IN TAIWAN
Autor: | Waits, John B. |
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Přispěvatelé: | Blanken, Leo J., Borer, Douglas A., Defense Analysis (DA) |
Rok vydání: | 2021 |
Předmět: |
China
unconventional deterrence SFAB Taiwan total defense Melian dialogue AWG CFT building partner capacity strategic interaction deception resistance PSYOP integrated deterrence security force assistance Thucydides trap ROC resistance operating concept resilience civil affairs comprehensive defense SOF BPC security cooperation strategic communication global strategic competition GPC Asymmetric Warfare Group asymmetric system dynamics PLA great power competition |
Popis: | Building partner capacity (BPC) is a vital strategic tool for the U.S. to compete with great power adversaries and deter aggression against partners and allies. But security partnerships and alliances are unique and complex adaptive systems; they display certain characteristics at the local level that lead to non-linear, system-wide emergent properties over time. Currently, the Joint Force and SOF enterprise lack a systems-based approach to develop and implement effective BPC strategies for great power competition (GPC). This thesis presents a systems approach to the trilateral relationship between Taiwan, China, and the U.S. in order to develop a common framework for BPC in the context of deterrence and GPC. Conventional "deterrence by punishment" strategies for Taiwan primarily focus on high-end arms sales, but an unconventional "deterrence by denial" strategy focused on civil resilience and threats of organized resistance could deter China by rendering its relative military superiority irrelevant, protracting a fait accompli indefinitely, and sabotaging its grand strategy. The Asymmetric Warfare Group's (AWG) advisory support in Taiwan as well as the Resistance Operating Concept (ROC) and NSHQ's Comprehensive Defence Handbook (CDH) provide ready-made frameworks to build Taiwan's capacity for resilience, resistance, and asymmetric defense. Additionally, strategic communication and deception through a continued policy of "strategic ambiguity" are essential elements. Major, United States Army Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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