| Přispěvatelé: |
Fonds National de la Recherche - FnR [sponsor], Biryukov, Alex [superviser], Müller, Volker [president of the jury], Gierlichs, Benedikt [member of the jury], Page, Daniel [member of the jury], Ryan, Peter [member of the jury] |
| Popis: |
This thesis is devoted to efficient and secure implementations of lightweight symmetric cryptographic primitives for resource-constrained devices such as wireless sensors and actuators that are typically deployed in remote locations. In this setting, cryptographic algorithms must consume few computational resources and withstand a large variety of attacks, including side-channel attacks. The first part of this thesis is concerned with efficient software implementations of lightweight symmetric algorithms on 8, 16, and 32-bit microcontrollers. A first contribution of this part is the development of FELICS, an open-source benchmarking framework that facilitates the extraction of comparative performance figures from implementations of lightweight ciphers. Using FELICS, we conducted a fair evaluation of the implementation properties of 19 lightweight block ciphers in the context of two different usage scenarios, which are representatives for common security services in the Internet of Things (IoT). This study gives new insights into the link between the structure of a cryptographic algorithm and the performance it can achieve on embedded microcontrollers. Then, we present the SPARX family of lightweight ciphers and describe the impact of software efficiency in the process of shaping three instances of the family. Finally, we evaluate the cost of the main building blocks of symmetric algorithms to determine which are the most efficient ones. The contributions of this part are particularly valuable for designers of lightweight ciphers, software and security engineers, as well as standardization organizations. In the second part of this work, we focus on side-channel attacks that exploit the power consumption or the electromagnetic emanations of embedded devices executing unprotected implementations of lightweight algorithms. First, we evaluate different selection functions in the context of Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) to infer which operations are easy to attack. Second, we show that most implementations of the AES present in popular open-source cryptographic libraries are vulnerable to side-channel attacks such as CPA, even in a network protocol scenario where the attacker has limited control of the input. Moreover, we describe an optimal algorithm for recovery of the master key using CPA attacks. Third, we perform the first electromagnetic vulnerability analysis of Thread, a networking stack designed to facilitate secure communication between IoT devices. The third part of this thesis lies in the area of side-channel countermeasures against power and electromagnetic analysis attacks. We study efficient and secure expressions that compute simple bitwise functions on Boolean shares. To this end, we describe an algorithm for efficient search of expressions that have an optimal cost in number of elementary operations. Then, we introduce optimal expressions for first-order Boolean masking of bitwise AND and OR operations. Finally, we analyze the performance of three lightweight block ciphers protected using the optimal expressions. |
