| Popis: |
While perhaps the most recognizable hallmark of David Hume's moral philosophy is his commitment to an anti-rationalist theory of ethics, I argue that Hume came to reject this position found the Treatise of Human Nature (1739) in his later Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751). In the Treatise, Hume endorses the view that reason is wholly inactive and cannot be the source of our sense of morals. According to the Treatise, our human reasoning does not give rise to the feelings of pleasure that we associate with an action being right. Instead, the determination we make that an action is right arises from feelings of approval that are rooted solely in natural sympathy and fellow-feeling, and these feelings never arise from reason. Yet, I argue that in the Second Enquiry, Hume abandons these anti-rationalist commitments and allows rational judgments of utility to give rise to the sentiments that ultimately approve our actions. In this paper, I argue for two claims about the role of reason in Hume's moral philosophy. First, I argue that in the Treatise, Hume is committed to a strong form of anti-rationalism where reason has no role in the process in which we approve/disapprove actions that are right or wrong. Second, I argue Hume moves away from these strong anti-rationalist commitments in the Treatise to a version of his moral theory where reason plays a role in making determinations of morality by allowing rational judgments of utility to give rise to the sentiments that approve actions. Finally, I argue that Hume makes these changes in the Second Enquiry to rule out an egoistic interpretation of his theory, and by accepting a rationalistic sentimentalism, Hume can defend his moral theory from an egoistic interpretation and prevent his system from collapsing into egoism. Master of Arts In the Treatise of Human Nature (1739) and the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), the Scottish philosopher David Hume argued for a moral theory where the rightness or wrongness of any action could be determined by our feelings of pleasure or pain that we feel when we have an idea of that action. While contemporary historians of philosophy agree that in the earlier Treatise version of his theory Hume did not allow these feelings associated with moral rightness to arise from reason, I argue that Hume fundamentally changed his theory in the later Second Enquiry to do just that. In particular, I argue that in the Treatise, Hume did not believe that our feelings about rightness or wrongness could arise from rational judgments. Nevertheless, in the Second Enquiry, Hume changed is theory to allow rational judgments about what is useful to give rise to those moral feelings. I then conclude that Hume made these changes to his theory to prevent his moral philosophy from reducing to a theory where only those actions that are in my self-interest could be considered morally right. |
