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Magistrsko delo obravnava vprašanje zlorabe prevladujočega položaja v farmacevtskem sektorju, in sicer z zaračunavanjem pretirano visokih cen za zdravila. Avtorica najprej predstavi člen 102 Pogodbe o delovanju EU, ki prevladujočim podjetjem prepoveduje zlorabiti svoj položaj, nato pa značilnosti te oblike omejevalnega ravnanja, njeno presojanje in posebnosti samega farmacevtskega sektorja, ki vplivajo na visoke cene zdravil. Temu sledi predstavitev pojma pretirano visokih cen, kot oblike zlorabe prevladujočega položaja, opisane pa so tudi različne metode presojanja pretirano visokih cen. Nadaljnje so analizirani (sicer redki) primeri, v katerih so konkurenčni organi odločili, da so farmacevtska podjetja zaračunavala pretirano visoke cene za zdravila in tako zlorabila svoj prevladujoč položaj, nato pa so predstavljeni še ukrepi, ki lahko poleg konkurenčnopravnega nadzora vplivajo na nižje cene zdravil. Avtorica ugotavlja, da je moč zaznati naraščajoče zanimanje konkurenčnih organov za preganjanje izkoriščevalskih oblik zlorab farmacevtskih podjetij, kamor spada zaračunavanje pretirano visokih cen za zdravila. Pri presojanju, ali so cene pretirano visoke, so konkurenčni organi v obravnavanih odločbah sledili dvostopenjskemu testu, ki ga je Sodišče EU predstavilo v zadevi United Brands, zato se je ta metoda izkazala kot primerna za presojanje neupravičeno visokih cen farmacevtskih proizvodov. Za samo preprečevanje zaračunavanja previsokih cen za zdravila pa je smiselno konkurenčnopravni nadzor kombinirati še z drugimi ukrepi, kot so povečanje izravnalne kupne moči, ustrezna regulacija cen zdravil in povečanje transparentnosti glede stroškov farmacevtskih podjetij. Master's thesis addresses the issue of abuse of a dominant position in the pharmaceutical sector by charging excessively high prices for medicines. The author starts by presenting the Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which prohibits dominant undertakings from abusing their position, and describes the characteristics of the abuse of dominant position, its assessment and the particularities of the pharmaceutical sector, which affect the high prices of medicines. The author further presents the concept of excessive pricing as a form of abuse of a dominant position and describes various methods for assessing the excessiveness of the prices. This is followed by a close analysis of (rare) cases where the competition authorities decided that pharmaceutical companies were guilty of charging excessively high prices for medicines and thus abused their dominant position. Lastly, the author presents measures that may, in addition to competition enforcement, help in lowering the prices of medicines. The author establishes that there is a growing interest of competition authorities in investigating exploitative forms of abuse by pharmaceutical companies, which includes excessive pricing of medicines. In assessing whether the prices were excessively high, the competition authorities followed the two-stage test presented by the Court of Justice of the EU in the case United Brands. This method therefore proved to be appropriate for the assessment of excessive prices of pharmaceutical products. In order to prevent unduly high prices of medicines, however, it is appropriate to combine competition law enforcement with other measures, such as increasing countervailing buyer power, appropriate price regulation of medicines and increasing transparency regarding the costs of pharmaceutical companies. |
