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Članek obravnava problematiko osebnega stečaja potrošnikov v slovenskem pravu. Avtor najprej analizira namen pravnega instituta in cilje, ki jih ta v družbi zasleduje. Pri tem upošteva tudi primerjalno-pravno metodo in ureditve v primerljivih pravnih redih. V drugem delu prispevka avtor prikaže delovanje postopka osebnega stečaja potrošnika in odpusta obveznosti v slovenski pravni uredirvi. V tretjem delu prispevka pa sledi ekonomska analiza spodbud dolžniku, da skuša v postopku odpusta obveznosti prispevati h kar največjemu poplačilu dolžnika. Ta analiza kaže, da upniki maksimirajo svoje poplačilo v sistemu, kjer ni odpusta dolga, tako dolgo, dokler skupna višina dolžnikovega dolga ne doseže stopnje, ko dolžnik več ni motiviran za sodelovanje in začne aktivno ovirati poplačilo upnikov. Takrat upniki poleg obstoječega dolžnikovega premoženja ne dobijo ničesar. Zato je boljša pravna ureditev, kjer se dolžniku pusti možnost delnega poplačila in primernega obnašanja v določenem obdobju, po tem pa je dolžnik prost večine obveznosti, kar mu omogoči novi začetek. Vendar tudi v tem primeru ne moremo računati na to, da bo dolžnik v delno poplačilo upnikov vlagal maksimalne napore. Zato bi bila še bolj primerna ureditev, kjer bi se dolžniku postavilo jasen in njegovim sposobnostim prilagojen ciljni znesek delnega poplačila dolga, ki je pogoj za odpust preostanka obveznosti (podobno kot v avstrijski ureditvi). The article deals with the problems of consumer bankruptcy in Slovenian law. In the first part author analyses what are the social purposes and goals of this legal institution. This is done with assistance of the comparative legal method taking into account the relevant comparable legal regulations. In the second part of the article author presents the function of the consumer bankruptcy and discharge of debt in Slovenian legal regulation. It is followed by the third part with an economic analysis of the debtor incentives for investment of a maximal effort to compensate creditors. This analysis shows how the maximal compensation is achieved in a system where there is no debt discharge and this is valid as far as the value of the debt does not reach a margin where the debtor has no more motivation for cooperation and he starts actively impeding the process of creditor’s compensation. In such situation the creditors repay from the existing debtor’s property only. Therefore it seems better to have a regulation where the debtor has an option to partially repay his debt and act adequately during a certain period of time, and then to have a discharge of the remaining debt which all give him a possibility for a fresh start. However, even in such situation we cannot expect debtor to invest his maximal effort in a partial compensation. It would therefore be a more effective to have a solution where a clear and to debtor position adjusted sum of partial compensation would be set as a condition to achieve a debt discharge (similar as in Austrian regulation). |
