Moral hazard, optimal unemployment insurance, and aggregate dynamics
| Autor: | Veracierto, Marcelo |
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| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2022 |
| Předmět: | |
| Popis: | In this paper, I explore how optimal aggregate dynamics can be shaped by the presence of moral hazard in unemployment insurance. I also analyze the optimal provision of unemployment insurance and the implications for the amount of cross-sectional heterogeneity. The economy that I consider embeds the Hopenhayn-Nicolini unemployment insurance model into a real business cycle model with search frictions. In a calibrated version I find that the presence of private information has large effects on optimal aggregate steady-state dynamics but not on aggregate fluctuations. In addition, I find that optimal consumption replacement ratios are approximately independent of the business cycle. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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