| Popis: |
This study, based largely on records held at the National Archives of Canada and the Directorate of History, Department of National Defence, examines the basic assumptions by which the English-speaking male officer was selected for the King's Commission during the Second World War. It argues that such assumptions embodied a conception of the officer as a "military manager," one who, in Morris Janowitz's conception is "concerned with the scientific and rational conduct of war.";It was in the First World War that a Canadian military manager first supplanted Sir Sam Hughes' ill-founded conceptions with a greater administrative and tactical efficiency. But an increasingly managerial, technical orientation to war was difficult to sustain in the peace-time forces after 1918. The King government's reluctance to commit large ground forces in 1939 prevented any thorough planning for a large army. The influence of the military manager--both technically trained trained civilians and military professionals--thus became most pronounced when the army grew beyond all expectations after 1940.;The military manager's conceptions of the place of industry and science on the modern battlefield directed central aspects of the officer corps' development, including its overall structure and the balance between the various fighting arms. The military manager further introduced innovative methods of "scientific" officer selection. Such efforts reveal the enormous difficulties of wartime administration, as well as the practical and theoretical limitations of the military manager. The thesis makes the case that the infantry officer in particular faced remarkable organizational, tactical and psychological challenges when the realities of battle did not mesh with the assumptions of the military manager. |
