| Autor: |
Medwed, M., Standaert, François-Xavier, Groszschaedl, J., Regazzoni, F., Proceedings of Africacrypt 2010 |
| Přispěvatelé: |
UCL - EPL/ELEC - Département d'électricité, UCL - SST/ICTM/ELEN - Pôle en ingénierie électrique |
| Jazyk: |
angličtina |
| Rok vydání: |
2010 |
| Popis: |
The market for RFID technology has grown rapidly over the past few years. Going along with the proliferation of RFID technology is an increasing demand for secure and privacy-preserving applications. In this context, RFID tags need to be protected against physical attacks such as Differential Power Analysis (DPA) and fault attacks. The main obstacles towards secure RFID are the extreme constraints of passive tags in terms of power consumption and silicon area, which makes the integration of countermeasures against physical attacks even more difficult than for other types of embedded systems. In this paper we propose a fresh re-keying scheme that is especially suited for challenge-response protocols such as used to authenticate tags. We evaluate the resistance of our scheme against fault and side-channel analysis, and introduce a simple architecture for VLSI implementation on RFID tags. In addition, we estimate the cost of our scheme in terms of area and execution time for various security/performance trade-offs. Our experimental results show that the proposed re-keying scheme provides better security (and does so at less cost) than other state-of-the-art countermeasures |
| Databáze: |
OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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