Trade Policy and Incentives for Cost Reduction in a Differentiated Industry: Price Vs. Quantity Competition
Autor: | Cabral, Célia Costa, Kujal, Praveen |
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Jazyk: | angličtina |
Rok vydání: | 1998 |
Předmět: | |
Popis: | The incentives for governments to impose subsidies and tariffs on R&D and output is analysed in a differentiated good industry where firms invest in a cost saving technology. When government commitment is credible, subsidies to R&D and output are positive both under Bertrand and Cournot competition. However, if the government cannot commit to a policy action, it chooses a tariff under Bertrand competition and a subsidy under Cournot competition. N/A |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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