| Popis: |
Many liberals believe in an interesting asymmetry. Generally, X does not have a right to pay Y to wrongfully harm Z. But X does have a right to persuade Y to wrongfully harm Z (at least if Y acts through a political process) What, if anything, justifies this belief? Though this is a central question of free speech, an adequate answer has not been given. I criticize a variety of accounts which focus on the interests served by speaking. I then criticize some accounts which focus on the proper division and use of power, along the way to offering a novel account of my own. I claim that restrictions of persuasion that could be justified only by their prevention of bad policies undermine social equality. In order for two people to stand as equal co-citizens, each one must have an equal say about the terms of the civic relationship and about what they do together, as citizens. Fully appreciating that other citizens are entitled to an equal say requires taking their impact upon the course of the civic relationship as no reason to prevent them from making it. |
