Are there 'Moral' Judgments?
| Autor: | Sackris, David, Rosenberg Larsen, Rasmus |
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| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2023 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | European Journal of Analytic Philosophy Volume 19 Issue 2 (online first) |
| ISSN: | 1849-0514 1845-8475 |
| Popis: | Recent contributions in moral philosophy have raised questions concerning the prevalent assumption that moral judgments are typologically discrete, and thereby distinct from ordinary and/or other types of judgments. This paper adds to this discourse, surveying how attempts at defining what makes moral judgments distinct have serious shortcomings, and it is argued that any typological definition is likely to fail due to certain questionable assumptions about the nature of judgment itself. The paper concludes by raising questions for future investigations into the nature of moral judgment. Nedavne rasprave u moralnoj filozofiji dovode postavljaju pitanja oko prevladavajuće pretpostavke da su moralni sudovi tipološki diskretni i da se stoga razlikuju od običnih i/ili drugih vrsta sudova. Ovaj rad se nadovezuje na ovu raspravu, razmatrajući nedostatke različitihi pokušaja definiranja onoga što čini neke sudove moralnima, te se tvrdi da svaka tipološka definicija vjerojatno neće uspjeti zbog upitnih pretpostavki o prirodi sudova. Rad zaključuje postavljanjem pitanja koja se odnose na buduća istraživanja prirode moralnih sudova. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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