When Redistribution Leads to Regressive Taxation

Autor:	Cyril Hariton, Gwen�el Piaser, Gwena�l Piaser
Rok vydání:	2006
Předmět:	Income Taxation Redistribution Labor market Multi-principals Adverse selection Mechanism design jel:D82 jel:L14 jel:D21 jel:H21
Popis:	We introduce labor contracts, in a framework of optimal redistribution: firms have some local market power and try to discriminate among heterogeneous workers. In this setting we show that if the firms have perfect information, i.e, they perfectly discriminate against workers and take all the surplus, the best tax function is flat. If the firms have imperfect information, i.e, if they offert incentive contracts, then (under some assumptions) the best redistributive taxation is regressive.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::d6a478092749d998d198daac21f8d8af http://www.unive.it/media/allegato/DIP/Economia/Working_papers/Working_papers_2006/WP_DSE_Hariton_Piaser_30_06.pdf Zobrazit plný text záznamu