The Role of Beliefs for the Sustainability of the Fiscal Constitution
| Autor: | Gerald Pech, Bernhard Neumaerker |
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| Rok vydání: | 2002 |
| Předmět: | |
| Popis: | Why does the government not defect from the constitution? This article focuses on the dynamic restraints the government faces under the rule of law: violations against unconstitutional laws are not punished under the constitution. If a violating government cannot commit itself never to reinstall the constitution enforcing an unconstitutional law becomes difficult. Citizens' expectations to go unpunished when not complying may be self-fulfilling. Deriving the equilibrium of a global game we show that this mechanism is effectively deterring a government from defecting from a constitutionally permissible tax rate. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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