| Popis: |
With a general definition of an argument in recent debates over offensive and hurtful language, attitudes and actions, that is characterized by a tendency to judge people, their language, attitudes and actions, negatively, by relying on feelings and perhaps too strong interpretations of the aforementioned, a need for a thorough understanding of critique and toleration is proposed. The argument is seen in discussions about everyday morality, popularly (or unpopularly) referred to as “krænkelseskultur”, which probably best translates into “a culture of taking offense (too easily)”. In looking to the practice of doing philosophy or living philosophically, as argued by the historian of philosophy Pierre Hadot, philosophy as a discipline is argued to have the potential, since it’s birth in ancient Greek, especially evolving around the character of Socrates, to guide people’s lives, if chosen. Together with the views of pragmatist Richard Rorty, philosophy is analyzed as the recognition that, when it comes to moral deliberation, knowing – and thereby the possibility of judging objectively – seems impossible and at the same time nonproductive for conveying a successful critique. For both Socrates and Rorty the concept of irony is central to living well and thereby, it is here argued, criticizing well.Critique is, therefore, argued best to be perceived as an attitude whose goal would be to reveal the contours of an existing morality so as to change it for the better. But the practice of doing critique in social settings has the latent possibility of shaming or casting people out, unnecessarily. Remembering the contingent character of morality, the critic is bidden to, first of all, look inwards, critically, to determine whether or not an experience of offense is tolerable. Tolerance is further analyzed as a practice with strong democratic effects, in that it makes the critic aware of other people’s rights to utter and think differently than the critic. The whole of this project should therefore be seen as an attempt to give the critic (in situations of the so-called offense-taking-argument) tools for dealing with the situation, both as to cope with experiencing offensive language, attitudes and actions, but also, and primarily, to better practice an attitude of moderation in the name of plurality, democracy and solidarity. This last theme is taken up with Rorty, mostly with his book Contingency, irony, and solidarity (1989), in underlining a common human project, where critique, as new ways of wording things and situations, is argued best to rely on shared human values and a recognition of both the contingency of morality and the fact that all humans are potentially hurt and humiliated, instead as in the taking-offense-argument to split people up in groups of offenders and offended with claims of objectively hurtful or offensive utterances. Solidarity is argued to be the primary effect of critique, in that it should be a practice that unites rather than divides. |
