Individual upper semicontinuity and subgame perfect ϵ-equilibria in games with almost perfect information
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
almost perfect information
subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium c62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium Evolutionary Games c72 - Noncooperative Games c65 - Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools individual upper semicontinuity Stochastic and Dynamic Games Repeated Games Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools Noncooperative Games Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium |
| DOI: | 10.26481/umagsb.2019002 |
| Popis: | We study games with almost perfect information and an infinite time horizon. In such games, at each stage, the players simultaneously choose actions from finite action sets, knowing the actions chosen at all previous stages. The payoff of each player is a function of all actions chosen during the game. We define and examine the new condition of individual upper semicontinuity on the payoff functions, which is weaker than upper semicontinuity. We prove that a game with individual upper semicontinuous payoff functions admits a subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium for every ϵ > 0, in eventually pure strategy profiles. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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