Four Fallacies about Analogical Reasoning and the Rule of Law
| Autor: | Kloosterhuis, Harm, Smith, CE, Feteris, E., Kloosterhuis, H., Plug, J., Smith, C. |
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| Přispěvatelé: | Theory and Methodology |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Zdroj: | Legal Argumentation and the Rule of Law, 99-109 STARTPAGE=99;ENDPAGE=109;TITLE=Legal Argumentation and the Rule of Law |
| Popis: | Analogical reasoning is as much contested as it is acclaimed as a tool of legal interpretation to ascertain the ideals of the Rule of Law. It is rejected because it would be infinitely malleable or just a form of deduction from rules. It is defended because it is a reasoned elaboration of law, or even the model of all reasoning. Debates between protagonists and antagonists of analogical reasoning are often unclear and even fallacious. In this contribution we will discuss four fallacies in this discussion. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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