The policy response 'failure' of the financial authorities, the bubbling of Japan's economy and causes of the largescale financial crisis : a summary, analysis and future prospects
| Jazyk: | japonština |
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| Rok vydání: | 2000 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | 総合政策 = Journal of policy studies. 2(2):163-182 |
| ISSN: | 1344-6347 |
| Popis: | 1997,98年の大規模な金融危機はなぜ生じたのか、その具体的プロセスを分析し、あわせてバブル形成期の1980年代後半の日本銀行の政策運営について検証する。これまで公表された多くの論評において、その期の日銀の政策的対応は国際均衡を国内均衡に優先させたという意味で、戦後最大級の政策上の失敗であったと批判されているが、ここでの結論は、金融政策の戦術面では失敗は認められるが、その戦略面では真の意味での失敗は容易に見いだしえないということである。最後に、今後も日銀の政策に失敗が生ずる可能性が強いわけであるが、それを防ぐ手だては何か、これについて1つの提言を示した。 This essay analyzes why the large-scale financial crisis of 1997 and 1998 occurred and examines the policy management of the Bank of Japan in the late 1980s, when Japan's "bubble" economy was generated. In a lot of the criticism which has been made public, the response of the Bank of Japan at that time was criticized as being the worst policy failure in the period since World War II in that it gave greater priority to international affairs than to domestic ones. However, the conclusion reached in this paper is that although failures in monetary policy tactics are recognized, failure in strategy is not especially evident. Finally, a suggestion is made as to how further policy failures by the Bank of Japan, which are strongly expected in the future, can be avoided. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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