Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and weakly dominated strategies in aggregative games with strategic substitutes : A note
| Autor: | Shinohara, Ryusuke |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
Computer Science::Multiagent Systems Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory Undominated strategies Aggregative games ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING MathematicsofComputing_GENERAL TheoryofComputation_GENERAL Strategic substitutes Coalition-proof Nash equilibirum |
| Zdroj: | Journal of International Economic Studies. 34:3-10 |
| ISSN: | 0911-1247 |
| Popis: | We examine the relation between coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim et al., 1987) and weakly dominated strategies in games with strategic substitutes (SS) and monotone externalities (ME). We show that in σ-interactive games with SS and ME, every coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium with undominated strategies. We also find as a by-product that the set of Nash equilibria coincides with the set of undominated Nash equilibria in those games. The relation between the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium and weakly dominated strategies in games with SS is completely different from that in games with strategic complements. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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