A strategy-proof mechanism should be announced to be strategy-proof : An experiment for the Vickrey auction
| Autor: | Masuda, Takehito, Sakai, Toyotaka, Serizawa, Shigehiro, Wakayama, Takuma |
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| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 1048:1-88 |
| Popis: | January 2019. Revised November 2019. We conduct laboratory experiments for the Vickrey auction with and without an announcement on strategy-proofness to subjects. Although the rate of truth-telling among the subjects stays at 20% without the announcement, it increases to 47% with the announcement. Moreover, by conducting experiments for the pay-your-bid auction, which is not strategy-proof, with and without advice, we find that our experimental results are not attributed to so-called experimenter demand effects. Strategy-proof mechanisms are sometimes criticized because players often fail to find the benefit of truth-telling, but our observations tell that introducing an educative announcement helps them behave“correctly.” |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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