Monotonicity and Egalitarianism (revision of CentER DP 2019-007)

Jazyk:	angličtina
Rok vydání:	2020
Předmět:	strong egalitarian core TU game egalitarian stability coalitional monotonicity aggregate monotonicity egalitarian core
Popis:	This paper identifies the maximal domain of transferable utility games on whichaggregate monotonicity (no player is worse o when the worth of the grand coalitionincreases) and egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by a transfer from a richer to a poorer player) are compatible. On this domain, which includes the class of large core games, we show that these two axioms characterize a unique solution which even satisfies coalitional monotonicity (no member is worse off when the worth of one coalition increases) and strong egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by transfers from richer to poorer players).
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dris___01181::507a4dd4732e5cdabe4fcb61721340cb https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/295f156e-91ad-4177-b61a-1dbf6949d4d0 Zobrazit plný text záznamu