Information aggregation with continuum of types
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Computer Science::Multiagent Systems
d80 - Information Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory Clubs Committees Knowledge and Uncertainty: General strategic voting d70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General private information c70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General efficient information aggregation |
| DOI: | 10.26481/umagsb.2017032 |
| Popis: | We consider an information aggregation problem where a group of voters wants to make a `yes' or `no' decision over a single issue. Voters have state-dependent common preferences, but hold possibly conflicting private information about the state in the form of types (signals). We assume that types are distributed from a state-dependent continuous distribution. In this model, Bayesian equilibrium voting and efficient voting coincide, and informative voting means that a voter votes in favor of the issue if and only if the signal exceeds a cut-point level. Our main result is an answer, in the form of a condition on the parameters of the model, to the question when informative voting is efficient. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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