Bullwhip and reverse bullwhip effects under the rationing game
| Autor: | Ying Rong, Lawrence V. Snyder, Zuo-Jun Max Shen |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Upstream (petroleum industry)
021103 operations research Supply chain Information sharing 05 social sciences 0211 other engineering and technologies Rationing Reservation Ocean Engineering 02 engineering and technology Management Science and Operations Research Microeconomics symbols.namesake Order (business) Order (exchange) Nash equilibrium Modeling and Simulation Bullwhip effect 0502 economics and business Economics symbols Profitability index Bullwhip 050203 business & management |
| Zdroj: | Naval Research Logistics (NRL). 64:203-216 |
| ISSN: | 1520-6750 0894-069X |
| Popis: | When an unreliable supplier serves multiple retailers, the retailers may compete with each other by inflating their order quantities in order to obtain their desired allocation from the supplier, a behavior known as the rationing game. In this paper, we provide the formal condition of the existence of the bullwhip effect (BWE) under the rationing game when the mean demand changes over time. Moreover, when the capacity information is shared and the capacity reservation mechanism is applied, we provide the condition when the reverse bullwhip effect (RBWE) occurs upstream, a consequence of the disruption caused by the supplier. In addition, we show that the smaller unit reservation payment leads to the severe [R]BWE. Finally, we find that capacity information sharing does not necessarily mitigate the [R]BWE and that it may reduce the profitability of the supply chain as a whole. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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