Simultaneous Search and Efficiency of Entry and Search Intensity
| Autor: | Christian Holzner, Pieter A. Gautier |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Economics, Tinbergen Institute |
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Sequential auction
SDG 16 - Peace ComputingMilieux_THECOMPUTINGPROFESSION Computer science media_common.quotation_subject SDG 16 - Peace Justice and Strong Institutions 05 social sciences Wage SDG 8 - Decent Work and Economic Growth Commit Social efficiency Justice and Strong Institutions Microeconomics Complete information 0502 economics and business 050207 economics Function (engineering) General Economics Econometrics and Finance Social optimum Intensity (heat transfer) 050205 econometrics media_common |
| Zdroj: | Gautier, P A & Holzner, C L 2017, ' Simultaneous search and efficiency of entry and search intensity ', American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 245-282 . https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20160088 American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 9(3), 245-282. American Economic Association |
| ISSN: | 1945-7685 1945-7669 |
| DOI: | 10.1257/mic.20160088 |
| Popis: | We consider a model where firms open vacancies and post and commit to a wage mechanism. Search is costly and workers simultaneously apply to multiple jobs. Firms can be connected to multiple workers and workers to multiple firms. We use a new method to derive the expected maximum number of matches in a large market as a function of the number of applications and market tightness. We also derive the conditions under which firm entry, worker participation, and search intensity are socially efficient. Finally, we show that a sequential auction under incomplete information can establish the social optimum and discuss some alternative mechanisms that can, under complete information of the entire network, also deliver social efficiency. (JEL D12, D44, D83, J23, J31, J64, M51) |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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