Social Preferences and Voting on Reform - An Experimental Study
Autor: | Rupert Sausgruber, Stefan Traub, Fabian Paetzel |
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Rok vydání: | 2012 |
Předmět: |
Value (ethics)
jel:D80 Economics and Econometrics media_common.quotation_subject 502010 Finanzwissenschaft Distribution (economics) Social preferences Political economy of reform Status quo bias Social preferences Voting Experiment political economy of reform / status quo bias / social preferences / voting / experiment 502027 Politische Ökonomie Voting Economics 502027 Political economy media_common 502010 Public finance jel:C92 Status quo bias Public economics business.industry 502024 Public economy jel:D72 502024 Öffentliche Wirtschaft Democracy Redistribution (election) business JEL C92 D72 D80 Finance Inequity aversion |
Zdroj: | SSRN Electronic Journal. |
ISSN: | 1556-5068 |
DOI: | 10.2139/ssrn.2066455 |
Popis: | Debating over efficiency-enhancing but inequality-increasing reforms accounts for the routine business of democratic institutions. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) hold that anti-reform bias can be attributed to individual-specific uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses resulting from a reform. In this paper, we experimentally demonstrate that anti-reform bias arising from uncertainty is mitigated by social preferences. We show that, paradoxically, many who stand to lose from reforms vote in favor because they value efficiency, while many who will potentially gain from reforms oppose them due to inequality aversion. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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