Monotonicity and egalitarianism
| Autor: | Bas Dietzenbacher |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | QE Math. Economics & Game Theory, RS: GSBE other - not theme-related research |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Class (set theory) Monotonic function Lmax solution c71 - Cooperative Games NUCLEOLUS 0502 economics and business Lmax 050207 economics Transferable utility solution Egalitarianism Selection (genetic algorithm) Axiom Mathematics aggregate monotonicity egalitarian core 05 social sciences TheoryofComputation_GENERAL CORES coalitional monotonicity Lexicographical order Cooperative Games procedural egalitarian solution Core (game theory) strong egalitarian core 050206 economic theory Mathematical economics SET Finance |
| Zdroj: | Games and Economic Behavior, 127, 194-205. Elsevier Science |
| ISSN: | 0899-8256 |
| Popis: | This paper identifies the maximal domain of transferable utility games on which aggregate monotonicity (no player is worse off when the worth of the grand coalition increases) and egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by a transfer from a richer to a poorer player) are compatible, which turns out to be the class of games where the procedural egalitarian solution selects from the core. On this domain, which includes the class of large core games, these two axioms characterize the solution that assigns the core allocation which lexicographically minimizes the maximal payoffs. This solution even satisfies coalitional monotonicity (no member is worse off when the worth of one coalition increases) and strong egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by transfers from richer to poorer players). |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|
Full Text from ScienceDirect