Vertical relations, opportunism, and welfare
| Autor: | Germain Gaudin |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | European Commission [Brussels], Télécom ParisTech, Département Sciences Economiques et Sociales (SES), Economie Gestion (ECOGE), Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation (I3, une unité mixte de recherche CNRS (UMR 9217)), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École polytechnique (X)-Télécom ParisTech-MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris, Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École polytechnique (X)-Télécom ParisTech-MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris, Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL) |
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Upstream (petroleum industry)
Economics and Econometrics Strategic complements media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences technology industry and agriculture [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance Competition (economics) Microeconomics 0502 economics and business Opportunism Business 050207 economics Welfare ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS health care economics and organizations Information exchange 050205 econometrics media_common |
| Zdroj: | RAND Journal of Economics RAND Journal of Economics, Wiley, 2019, 50 (2), pp.342-358. ⟨10.1111/1756-2171.12272⟩ |
| ISSN: | 1756-2171 0741-6261 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/1756-2171.12272 |
| Popis: | This article revisits the opportunism problem faced by an upstream monopolist contracting with several retailers over secret agreements, when contracts are linear. We characterize the equilibrium under secret contracts and compare it to that under public contracts in a setting allowing for general forms of demand and retail competition. Market distortions are more severe under secret contracts if and only if retailers' instruments are strategic complements. We also investigate the effect of opportunism on firms' profits. Our results remain robust whether retailers hold passive or wary beliefs. We derive some implications for the antitrust analysis of information exchange between firms. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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