Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types
| Autor: | Olivier Compte, Philippe Jehiel |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PJSE), École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris School of Economics (PSE), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), University College of London [London] (UCL) |
| Rok vydání: | 2009 |
| Předmět: |
05 social sciences
Stochastic game Veto jel:D82 jel:C78 Subsidy JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C78 - Bargaining Theory • Matching Theory [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance Microeconomics 0502 economics and business Economics Common value auction 050206 economic theory Inefficiency General Economics Econometrics and Finance Private information retrieval Constraint (mathematics) Mathematical economics JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information Knowledge and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design 050205 econometrics Participation constraint |
| Zdroj: | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, 2009, 1 (1), pp.182-206. ⟨10.1257/mic.1.1.182⟩ |
| ISSN: | 1945-7685 |
| DOI: | 10.1257/mic.1.1.182 |
| Popis: | We consider bargaining problems in which parties have access to outside options, the size of the pie is commonly known and each party privately knows the realization of her outside option. We allow for correlations in the distributions of outside options. Parties have a veto right, which allows them to obtain at least their outside option payoff in any event. Besides, agents can receive no subsidy ex post. We show that inefficiencies are inevitable whatever the exact form of correlation, as long as private information is dispersed. We also illustrate how veto constraints differ from ex post participation constraints. (JEL C78, D82) |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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