Private Votes on Untrusted Platforms: Models, Attacks and Provable Scheme
| Autor: | Constantin Catalin Dragan, Steve Kremer, Sergiu Bursuc |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Proof techniques for security protocols (PESTO), Inria Nancy - Grand Est, Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Department of Formal Methods (LORIA - FM), Laboratoire Lorrain de Recherche en Informatique et ses Applications (LORIA), Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Laboratoire Lorrain de Recherche en Informatique et ses Applications (LORIA), Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lorraine (UL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), University of Surrey (UNIS) |
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Scheme (programming language)
Computer science Electronic voting media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Computational indistinguishability 020206 networking & telecommunications 02 engineering and technology Cryptographic protocol Computer security model 16. Peace & justice computer.software_genre Computer security Automated theorem proving [INFO.INFO-CR]Computer Science [cs]/Cryptography and Security [cs.CR] Voting 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Malware 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences computer 050104 developmental & child psychology media_common computer.programming_language |
| Zdroj: | 2019 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) EuroS&P 2019-4th IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy EuroS&P 2019-4th IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy, Jun 2019, Stockholm, Sweden EuroS&P |
| DOI: | 10.1109/eurosp.2019.00050 |
| Popis: | International audience; Modern e-voting systems deploy cryptographic protocols on a complex infrastructure involving different computing platforms and agents. It is crucial to have appropriate specification and evaluation methods to perform rigorous analysis of such systems, taking into account the corruption and computational capabilities of a potential attacker. In particular, the platform used for voting may be corrupted, e.g. infected by malware, and we need to ensure privacy and integrity of votes even in that case. We propose a new definition of vote privacy, formalized as a computational indistinguishability game, that allows to take into account such refined attacker models; we show that the definition captures both known and novel attacks against several voting schemes; and we propose a scheme that is provably secure in this setting. We moreover formalize and machine-check the proof in the EasyCrypt theorem prover. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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